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In the study of the conduct and control of foreign policy we are
seldom able to discern -with clarity the exact point of departure from
one course of action with regard to another country to a different
course, perhaps diametrically opposed to the first, Tho locus of
change is more often than not obscured by the many and complex vari-
ables affecting both nations involved in any particular policy set.
Fruitful analysis becomes hapliazard, if not do-wnright impossible,
when more than one pairtioipant must react draioatically and sometines
unpredictably to daily internal and external pressures.
It is indeed rare in modem times to discover" a policy set of
some importance whose twistings and turnings stand out relatively
open and unobscured. This can occur only when one of the two partic-
ipants has remained frozen throughout the duration of the policy
under analysis; frozen in the sense that it has remained immutable
against all pressures for change. Among the nations of the world
Franco Spain stands nearly alone as just such a frozen constant
within an arena of variables. For over one quarter of a centuiy the
administration, its governmental hierarchy, its politics, and its
modn ?j npft-randi has remained fundaraontally unchanged. It is this
characteristic of almost drastic sameness that endows Spain with
utility for research and an appeal for the student of foreign policy.
By far the most interesting point of focus in policy analysis
is in the vicinity of radical alteration. In the history of United
States foreign policy there have been few alterations as swiftly
made or as total in their effect as that which occurred vis-a-vis
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Spain during the period from 19hS to 195^« The actions and purposes
of the United States throughout that decade as it eiltered its course
and evolved its policy with Spain stand out all the more clearly for
analysis because of the latter* s nearly desperate inflexibility.
This paper "will trace the events that took place during that
span of ten years, emphasizing those that were causative or focal to
United States policy, and pausing only briefly with those that were
merely contributory, As a necessary preamble, certain events that
predated the 19U5 to 195^ period will be given some initial attention,
Other^dLse, all other events chosen to illustrate policy evolution
will be drawn from within the period and will be presented in chrono-
logical order.
Having assumed Spain to be a fixed quantity, attention is given
only incidentally to actions taken by the Spanish Government, Due to
the necessarily restricted depth of this study some ©vents that were
germane, but of minor importance to the formulation of United States
policy have been entirely omitted. The Spanish occupation of Tangier
was one such event. Where lengthy details have been left out suit-
able explanations accompany the text.
Some running analysis follov7s the presentation of the more
important events and at the conclusion of the account a short summary
enumerates such essentials of analysis as the assuiaptions held by
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No treatment of Spain in the post VJorld War II era is possible
without a backward glance at the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939.
Perhaps the single most i]:iiportant character of that war was Don
Francisco Franco Y Bahamonde i;ho, lontil 12:30 A.M., July 17 1936,
vas an outwardly loyal general in the regular army of Republican
Spain, Franco, at kk, was a much decorated hero of the bloody Riff
Campaign in Spanish Morocco and also a product of the aristocratic
officer corps typical of most Earopf?sn armies, A graduate of the
Alcazar and one of the organizers of the ragged Spanish Foreign
Legion, the General's first loyalty was to the Ai^y, and through
the Army to the social order which it protected. Included in this
social order was, of course, the Roman Catholic Church in Spain, of
which Franco and many of his fellow officers were devout members, J
In the few years since the birth of the Spanish Republic in
1931, General Franco and his military contemporaries had watched
with grovdng alami as "Piadical" and "Popular Front" governments
had whittled away at the power of the Church in the name of the
"donocratic republic of workers, "^ Religious orders were sup-
pressed, divorce was legalized. Church propei^iy was confiscated,
and the Jesuits (who controlled much of the educational system in
Spain) were expelled. Then came the Army's turn. The socialist
government that came to power in February 1936, slashed the Army's
Carlton J, H. Hayes, The United States and Spain (New Yoi*k:
Sheed and Ward, 1951), p. 90,

2appropriation, reduced its authorized strength, and forceably retired
8,000 commissioned officers. Generals kno-wn to be of conservative
sympathies were removed from positions of power and politely exiled to
distant posts. ^ General Franco, who had risen to Chief of Staff of the
Army was dispatched to the island of Tenerife in the Canaries.
These rapid changes to the long entrenched social system were
not accomplished without serious popular unrest and friction. Ideo-
logical differences gave i:ay to demonstrations and then to riots. The
riots brought police repression in ever severer terms. Gun battles in
the streets between Left and Right (the "Popular Front" and the Falanjp
Party) became the order of the day,^
At some point during that spring and early summer of 1936, the
long-simmering dissatisfaction and frustration of the Spanish Officer
Corps crystallized into a full-blown conspiracy. Loosely allied with
the Falange Party, the senior army commanders plotted to reraove the
incumbent socialist government by force. By lato June three key
general officers were committed to action: General Mola in Kavarra
and Old Castile, General Queipo do Llano in Andalucia, and General
Francisco Franco, who was still on Tenerife, Franco's role would b©
the assumption of command of all Spanish forces in Morocco and the
movement of those forces to Spain where they would link up with
those of Mola and Queipo de Llano to form a pincers around the seat
of the Republican Government in Madrid, General Jose Sanjurjo, "The
Lion of the Riff," who had led an abortive officers' revolt in 1932,
Sl-iayes, The United States
»
p, 101,
•'An excellent account of the period leading up to the revolt is
found in Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper and
Brothers, I96I), pp. 3-130,

3would fly from exilo in Portugal to Salamanca where he would take
command of the insurgents, who were soon to be known as the Movi-
miento Naoional
,
Plans were carefully laid for Franco's trip from Tenerife to
Tetuan, in Morocco, If he arrived before the moment of revolt his
presence would alert the Government; if he delayed, the rank and
file mipiht hesitate to follow rebellious officers of less distinguished
reputation, A network of agents arranged for a modem British air-
plane of private ownersliip to be placed at his disposal on the air-
field at Las Palmas, the main island of the Canaries,^ The date
chosen for the revolt was July l8 1936, and two nights earlier
General Franco caught the midnight inteidsland steamer that would
take him to Las Palmas,
Awaiting this uprising by its generals was a Spain already in
agony. On July 11, a bitter attack had been made on the floor of the
Spanish Cortes against the Government by Jose Calvo Sotelo, a dis-
tinguished Conservative deputy and foximer Minister of Finance, "That,"
screamed Dolores Ibarruri, the Comraunist deputy known as La Pasionaria,
"is your last speechl" Before dawn on July 13, Sotelo was taken from
his home by members of the Guardias de Asalt
o
(shock police), and
squeezed into an official car for a ride to a local cemetery. En
route, he was shot twice in the back of the neck by a professional
pistolero brought along especially for the occasion,^ The shock and
sense of outra.^e that swept the Spanish nation in the follovjing days
^Jin interesting view of this side light on the conspiracy is
given in Sir Robert Hodgson, Spain Resurgent (London: Hutchinson, 1953), B^* 39-UO,
SThomas, The Spanish Civil VJar. pp, 121-12U,

uaptly set the stage for the Army revolt.
The revolt however, did not proceed exactly as planned,
Catalonia had been promised autonomy by the Government and indeed
provided much of the proletarian base for the socialist movement,
\ihen General Goded, one of Franco's fellow conspirators, arrived
in Barcelona to lead the uprising there he was arrested, court-
martialed, and executed. Then, on July 20, General Sanjurjo's
plane crashed on the way to Salamanca and the uprising was left
without a leader to face a legitimate government that was fast
rallying support. Besides having the advantage of controlling
the machinery of the central government with unified leadership,
the Republic also possessed the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain
and two well trained military organizations distinct from the Army
- the Guardia Civil, and the Guardia de Asaltp . Using the loyal
province of Catalonia as its base, the Republican Government
showed that it xras capable of tenacious resistance to the Anny*s
rebellion. What perhaps had begun as a typical coup by a military
junta now became war; war with all of its attendant trappings and
with that special ferocity peculiar to those conflicts where a
nation state attempts to kill a part of itself.
As the Govemmenfis counterattack grew in intensity the rebels
found themselves desperately lacking two necessaiy ingredients for
success in a protracted struggle: central leadership and an in-
dustrial base of supply. The first ingredient was provided at the
earliest opportunity for a conference of the senior p>artners in the
revolt. After nearly two months of continuous seesaw fighting the

5generals met at the airfield at Salananca on September 12. Obviously,
the unified command of the rebel soldiery* must be given to the most
capable warriorj but also to the warrior with the greatest prestige
and popular appeal. The "Lion of the Riff" was dead and the other
generals were mostly unknown to (or hated by) the people of Spain.
The one exception was Franco, and so, by unanimous consent, he became
the Generalissimo, HL Caudillo, and, by a Decree dated September 29
1936, the "Head of the Government of the Spanish State, "6
The second ingcedient, the source of supply, was more difficult
to procure. It was to become even more of a difficulty for the Repub-
licans, Leon Bluni's French "Popular Front" Government in Paris was a
first cousin of the Madrid Govemraent and therefore received the Re-
publicans' first call for help, Blum was anxious to respond immedi-
ately but first had to overcome the resistance of his President, M,
Albert Lebrun, who feared that to supply arms to the socialist govern-
ment of Spain would provide the fascist states, Na2d. Germany and Italy,
with an excuse for sending arms to Franco, with whom they seemed to be
in sympathetic communication, Blum had his way however, and by August
1, less than two weeks after the revolt began, French bombers and bombs,
artillery pieces, machineguns and bullets were arriving in Republican
Spain, Just north of the Pyrenees training camps were opened and the
recruiting of international volunteers began.
The British, sensing the escalation that might result if the
restless tigers in Berlin, Rome, and Moscow were to choose sides in
the Spanish conflict desperately pressed for neutrality. The Conserva-
oHodgson, Spain Resurgent,pp, U5-U6,

6tive Baldwin Government was involved in the process of reversing an
eighteen year trend of disarmament in view of the menacing complexion
of the continent and simply could not risk another irapotent adventure
in leadership like the Abyssinian debacle of the previous year. Even
Winston Churchill, from his seat in the House of Commons, i;ould admit
"an absolute rigid neutrality with the strongest possible protest
against any breach of it is the only safe course at the present time ."7
Britian took the lead in establishing the International Non-
intervention Committee on September 9 1936, The Agreement fostered
by this Committee and "adhered to" by ©very nation in Europe had the
dual effect of denying the historical rights of a belligerent to
Franco and making it next to impossible for the Republican Govern-
ment to procure arms through normal channels.
Across the Atlantic, the United States was also in a mood for
neutrality. The post VJorld War I Revisionists had done their W) rk
so well that even membership on the World Court was considered a
dangerous entanglement, Franklin Roosevelt, facing a fall election,
was busy administering trial and error economics to a still largely
depressed nation. During the previous February an apprehensive
Congress had passed the second in a series of Neutrality Acts, de-
signed to ensure that the administration's interest could not turn
toward foreign conflicts, Roosevelt's interest had turned however,
but only in a private xjay. We are told by Mrs. Roosevelt that
"Franlclin frequently refrained from supporting causes in which he
believed because of political realities. In the case of the Spanish
7 rTodgr.cn, Spain Resurgent, p, UTI

7Civil War, for instance, we had to remain neutral, though Franldin
knew quite well he wanted the der.iocratic government to be successful, "^
The former Secretary of State, Hcnr:/ L. StimGon however, was
ready to make it very clear that the failure of the United States to
help Republican Spain (through misdirected observance of the Non-
intervention Agreement) would be a cause for national guilt.
The Republican Govemraent of Spain has been recog-
nized as the true Government of Spain by our Govern-
ment,. , . One of the most important of those rights
VThich a state like Spain is entitled to e::pcct from
another Government, which has recognized it as a friend-
ly neighbor in the family of nations ^ is the right of
self-defense against any future rebellions which may
challenge its authority.
Such a nation (has) the exclusive right ,,, to pur-
chase the necessary supplies and munitions for the
purpose of putting dovm the rebellion.
The first thing to be said about this agreement ^^s
that it was a complete abandonment of a code of practice
which the international world had adopted through pro-
ceeding ages ... , The non-intervention agreement at
once becaine a mockery and a failure .,, .
If this Loyalist Government is overthrown, it is
evident now that its defeat will be solely due to the
fact that it has been deprived of its right to buy from
us and from other friendly nations the munitions neces-
sary for its defense,
9
VJhile the Republican Government of Spain could not buy munitions
from its old friends, a new friend suddenly appeared to provide willing
assistance of various kinds. Prior to the revolt the Republicans had
had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, but on August 27,
six weeks after the fighting started. Comrade Marcel Rosenberg anrived
from Moscox'J to present himself as Stalin's Ambassador, Three vzeeks
later the Russian Preraier expressed his sentiments and his intentions
oAniia Eleanor Roosevelt, This I Remember ( New York: Harper and
Brothers, 19U9), p. l6l.
9Henry L. Stimson, Letter to The New York Times; published by the
Tjjties, January 2U, 1939.

8in a telegram to the Communist Party in Spain,
The workers of the Soviet Union in rendering
all their aid to the revolutionary masses in Spain,
are merely doing their duty. They are avxare tliat
to liberate Spain from oppression by Fascist re-
actionaries is not the duty of Spaniards only, but
the common task of advanced and progressive humanity.
Brotherly greetings I "^O
On the heels of this telegram came Russian technicians, military
instructors, engineers, and a handful of generals under assumed
names. To maintain surveillance on these advisers Stalin pro-
vided a contingent of the Tcheka which was allowed by the Repub-
lican Government to employ the same methods that it used within
the Soviet Union, In addition to the advisers Russia provided
military planes, artillery, vehicles and other munitions on a
strictly cash basis.
Now, despite pledges to the Non-intervention Committee, both
France and the Soviet Union were helping the Republicans to resist
the Franco forces which had begun to call themselves Nationalists,
If they should overwhelm Franco, Spain would emerge as a socialist-
communist triumph and the balance of power in Earope would shift
toward a Moscow, Paris, Madrid axis and away from the other axis
that ran through Berlin and Rome,
Both Hitler and Mussolini were acutely aware of the stakes
being risked in Spain and agreed that they could not afford a
Leftist victory that would effectively flank both of than. On
November l8 1936, both the German and Italian Governments formally
lOHodgson, Spain Resurgent, p. 5l»

9broke off diplomatic relations with Republican Spain and recognized
the Franco Nationalist Government in Salaraanca. Ten days later
Franco signed a secret treaty of friendship and non-aggression with
El Puce and the problem of the second ingredient, a source of supply,
was solved.
It is not within the scope of this paper to detail either the
relative effectiveness of the various external assistance provided
to both sides of the Spanish Civil V^'ar or the events of the \J3.r
itself. Suffice it to say that the Axis Powers provided enough of
whatever was necessary to tip the scales in favor of Francisco Franco,
On March 18 1939, the victorious Nationalist Army paraded in Madrid
and two weeks later Franc© declared the war to be officially over.

II
THE BEGINNBIGS OF A SPANISH POLIHY
Throughout the world liberal democrats, laborites, fellow travelers,
socialists^, and communists were shocked and disraayed by the Civil War's
outcome. Dismay turned to foreboding as the now unchallenged ruler of
Spain became the fourth signatory (id.th Germany, Japan, and Italy) to
the Anti-Comintern Pact and later withdrew from the League of Nations,
Of course. Hitler' s growing incursions had already alerted most of '
Europe to the coming conflagration and in an effort to allay suspicions
of Spain's intentions after the Civil War Franco informed Britian on
September 2? 1938, that.
The Government of Spain intends to maintain complete
neutrality in the event of the outbreak of vxar in Central
Europe on condition that no Power provokes vra.r in National-
ist territory. Their air and armed forces will in no cir-
cumstances cross the Spanish frontier so long as Spain is
not attacked,
1
After signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, Franco felt it necessary to
give similiar assurances of neutral intentions to the French Ambassador
to Madrid and finally, on September h 1939, the Decree of Neutrality
'was issued.
As, officially war has broken out and unfortunately
exists between Poland, Great Britian and France on the
one hand and Germany on the other, I ordain by the
present Decree the most strict neutrality on the pairt
of Spanish subjects in accordance mth tha contemporary
laws and principles of International Law.
2





Neutrality for Spain ;jas of course the only sensible path open
to Franco, Spain had not been cither strong or vxealthy before the
Civil VJar and could ill afford the disrupted economy and physical
loss of manpower brought on by nearly three years of fighting. No
real degree of recovery had been accomplished during the five month
span between the Civil War and Hitler's invasion of Poland and it
was obvious that Franco could make no meaningful contribution to
any joint venture with the Axis. A belligerent Spain that mi.ght,
with luck (and a good deal of Gorman help) seize Gibraltar and seal
off the Mediterranean might also be a vulnerable Spain accessible
as a backdoor into "Fortress Europe," Why should Hitler care to
divide the spoils of his triumphant early campaignes mth a non-
productive allyj particularly after side-stepping any communist
menace by signing the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union?
However, on meeting X'dLth the unexpected tenacity of Winston
Churchill and the Puayal Air Force in August I9U0, and the general
shift of focus from Europe to North Africa, the Fiihrer decided that
Spain might Just serve to turn the British flank. But Franco proved
even less eager to join in the hostilities than had Mussolini, Nazi
documents captured by the Allies after the war show that Spain's
endurance as an active belligerent could last no more than two or
three months and that any military sue ness that Franco might achieve
against Britian trauld necessitate an unacneptable level of support
from Germany,-^ VJith the coming of fall and the indefinite postpone-
ment of the invasion of Britian Hitler decided that Spain's partici-
3U, S,, Department of State, The Spanish Government and the Axis,-•u. o iiepartm o 01 ijxa'oe, in a ni. n u
European Series No, 8 (Washington, 19i;6), pp, 3-6,
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pation would be X'lorth the support required. A personal meeting took
place between Hitler and Franco in the former's private parlor car
at the railroad station at Kendaye, France, on October 23, I9U0,
Franco was quick to express his sympathy for the Axis cause and his
willingness to take his place as a full partner in war. However,
there must be extensive preparations in Spain before she could be-
come such a partner; these he enumerated in the economic, military,
and political spheres. Despite a plea by Hitler for immediate action
the conference unded with no firm commitment of Spanish entry, *^
Although Franco agreed in December I9U0, to allow German tankers
to refuel U-boats and Nazi destroyers in out-of-the-vjay bays on the
Spanish coast he balked at a German proposal to employ German troops
"vrithin Spain on the following month for an assault on Gibraltar,^
By February Hitler had reached the point of bribing Franco with
promises of much needed grain to make up for a poor Spanish harvest
and curtailed shipments from the western hemisphere. Still Franco
demurred, though again with many earnest confirmations of his loyalty
towards Berlin and Rome," Finally, in June I9UI, Hitler began his
push into Russia and plans for a more active role on the part of Spain
no longer interested him. Indeed, within tv;enty months Berlin would
be satisfied with a simple pledge that Spain would not allow herself
to be invaded by the Allies,'^
Naturally, Spain's non-participation was pleasing to the VJestem







Powers "who had more than enoush to do in containing Gerifiany and Italy
(and later Japan), Churchill's, and then Roosevelt's objectives were
to prevent Spain from (l) joining the Axis as a 'belligerent, (2) giving
military assistance short of going to mr, (3) supplying the Jlxis vdth
strategic materials, and (i;) withholding strategic materials from the
Allies,^ Duo to an cffoctive policy of econoriiic coercion and concoosion
and to Franco's delaying tactics with Hitler all of those objectives
were either completely or relatively successful.
After entering the war the United States initially followed a
policy of coercion only and stopped all shipments to Spain, probably
due to a notion prevalent in the State Department hierarchy that Spain
vjould ultimately join the war on the Axis side in any case,'^ Sumner
Welles however, acting during March 19U2, as Secretary of State in
Cordell Hull's absence, persuaded President Roosevelt to order contin-
uation of shipments and to appoint as Ambassador to Spain a distinguished
Roman Catholic, Carlton J, K, Hayes .-^^ Concession and conciliation had
their desired effects and the groundwork was laid for further disassocia-
tion of Madrid from Berlin and Rome,
Again, it is not within the scope of this paper to relate the many
and varied details of Spain's neutral policy (or of the breaches thereof)
during the course of the war. It is enough to point out that Spain took
no hostile action against the Allies (xd.th one notable exception, the
Blue Division, which will be mentioned in connection with the Potsdam
8c-addis Sinith, Araerican Diplomacy During the Second VJorld IVar, 19^-
19U5 (Kc;j York: Jolin VMley and Sons, 1965), p. 32.
9lbid., pp. 32-33.
lO^'or a personal acr:ount of this ap-^ointment see Carlton J, H. Hayes,




Conference), and denied the /jcis Powers all but token use of her
territory for military operations. It is however, very important to
relate the attitudes of the western leaders of that period because
those attitudes would determine the post war policies vis-^-vis the
Franco Government in Spain,
Franklin Roosevelt, it is recalled, was sympathetic i^th the
Republican forces during the Spanish Civil War but on the occasion
of the North African invasion in November 19ii2, he wrote to reassure
Franco: >
Your nation and mine are friends in the best sense
of the word ,,. you and I are sincerely desirous of the
Continuation of that friendship for our mutual good ... •
I believe the Spahish Government and the Spanish people
id-sh to maintain neutrality and to remain outside the war,
Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations, I am,
n^r dear General, your sincere friend.-'-^
But despite the warta tone of that letter Roosevelt was still far
from being convinced that Franco was altogether respectable. In June
19Uii, the President disparaged Spain's "neutrality" because "in his
judgement Spain had not yet sufficiently reduced the volume of its
material aid to Germany" and he "did not think any of us were satis-
fied with what the Government of Spain had been doing since we have
been in the war,"^^
Simultaneously, in Congress sentiments stronger than lack of
satisfaction were being voiced by lawmakers who were eager to see
Franco share the impending fate of Hitler, During the previous
l^Hayes, VJar-birag Mission
, p. 91.
12Conversation with President Roosevelt quoted by the Honorable
F, C. Crawford, U, S., Congressional Record
,
78th Cong,, 2d sess,.
Vol, 90, pt. 9, p. A275I;:
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Febroaiy the Honorable John M, Coffee of the Stato of Washington
had cited several examples of Spanish assistance to the A2d.s. The
most important (to Coffee) being the contributiaon of Franco's neutral
merchant fleet in bringing various products from llorbh and South
America to Spain for, according to Coffee, eventual shipment to
Germany, With surprising lack of respect for international law
(and a strange intsrpretation of the principle of freedom of the
seas) Representative Coffee urged Congress to "drive Spanish shipping
from the free vraters of the world until Spain once again returns to
the family of civilized democratic nations, "-^^
Kai:, in Juno of 19hh, Coffee took encouragement from Roosevelt's
attitude and proposed House Resolution 600, After reciting the histoiy
of Franco's association v/ith the Axis Powers Coffee alleged that it was
Franco's goal to win back the lost empire of the Philippines, Puerto
Rico, and Cuba, In addition Coffee described conditions of subversion
and pro-Nazism in Latin America induced by the Falange, Spain's single
political party. The remedy, in the words of Coffee's resolution was
tot
,., speed our victory and guarantee a lasting peace
by immediately breaking off all diplomatic relations vri.th
the Nazi-Falangist Government of Spain, " and further,
.,, thaj. the breaking of diploiiiatic relations with the
Axis Government of Spain should be followed by the appoint-
ment of a military commission which will be charged vxith
the task of getting arms, ammunition and medical supplies
to the heroic Republican guerrilla annies of Spain when
their revolt, tinied to wcalcen the Nazi armies in their
moment of greatest crisis, creates in Spain one of the
active and decisive battlefields of this global vrar,-^^
13u, s.. Congressional Record, 78th Cong,, 2d sess,. Vol, 90, pt, 2,
pp, 20l;0-20i|ii,




Although the Housg Forcisn Affairo CortimitteQ did littlo more
than politoly ignore this resolution (or a second, almost identical
one the following year), it did serve as an indicator that the polit-
ical passions raised by the 1936 to 1939 war had not yet cooled, A
measure of those anti-Franco passions x^as a Madison Square Garden
rally of the follox^ing January where the same Congressman Coffee
warned a packed house of 18,000 sympathizers that:
Spain is a rich country, on industrial Mdas,
Spain has everything to forge a pox^'erful industrial
bastion, A post xjar Spain controlled by Genaaii car-
tels vjould be a powerful industrial and political
base of operations against one main target; the United
States of America, -^5
Two months later President Roosevelt took the oc-^asion of
changing ambassadors to Spain for an opportunity to define his pre-
cise views toxjard the government in Madrid* Because the letter
he wrote to the new ambassador, Mr, Norman Armour, largely set the
theme for the policy that took shape in the years immediately follow-
ing it is quoted here in full.
March 10, 19i;5
1^ Dear Mr. Armour;
In connection vjith your now assignraent as Ambassador
to Madrid I want you to have a frank statement of my
views xjith regard to our relations xjith Spain,
Having been helped to poxjer by Fascist Italy and Nasi
Germany, and having patterned itself along totalitarian
linos the present regime in Spain is naturally the sub-
ject of distrust by a great many American citizens x-jho
find it difficult to see the justification for this
country to continue to maintain relations xjith such a
regirae. Most certainly we do not forget Spain* s offic-
ial position xjith and assistance to our Axis enemies
at a time when the fortunes of war x-iere less favorable
to us, nor can xve disregard the activities, airas, organ-
izations, and public utterances of the Falange, both
past and present. These memories cannot be wiped out




by actions more favorable to us now that xvre are about
to achieve our goal of complete victory over those
enemies of ours vjith tJhom the present Spanish regime
identified itself in the past spiritually and by its
public expressions and acts.
The fact that our government maintains formal diplo-
matic relations vjith the present Spanish rcgiino should
not be interpreted by anyone to imply approval of that
regime and its sole parby^ the Falange^ which has been
openly hostile to the United States and which has tried
to snread its fascist party ideas in the VJestom Ilcmis-
phara. Our victoiy over Germany vjill carry v;ith it the
extermination of Nasi and similiar ideologies.
As you Icna;, it is not our practice in normal circum-
stances to interfere in the internal affairs of other
countries unless there exists a "ohreat to international
peace. The form of govemraent in Spain and the policies
pursued by that Governitient are quite properly the con-
cern of the Spanish people, I should be lacking in can-
dor, Lowever, if I did not tell you that I can see no
place in the cominunity of nations for governraents founded
on fascist principles,
VJe all have the roost friendly feelings for the Spanish
peOijio and wo are anxious to see a development of cordial
relations xdth them, Thera are many things which we could
and normally ^rould be glad to do in economic and other
fields to demonstrate that friendship. The initiation of
such measures is out of the question at this time, however,
when Merican sentiment is so profoundly opposed to the
present regime in power in Spain,
Therefore, we earnestly hope that the time may come soon
when Spain may assur.ie the role and the responsibility




One month later President Roosevelt was dead, but it was soon to
become apparent that his vieiJs on the Spanish i^ostion would guide
American policy throughout the early post war period. Indeed, the
letter to Ambassador Armour gave more than an outline for the conduct
of United States relations \nX\i Sioain, "I'Jo do not forget ,,, nor can
we disregard" wrote Roosevelt, those memories that "cannot be wiped
•'-'-^U, S,, Department ox btate Sulletin^ September 30, 19U5, p« li66.
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out," Therefore there would be no absolution for Spain's past dere-
lictions. The President took care to emphasize that normal relations
should not "imply approval" of the Franco ro{;jimG or of the Falange,
thus leaving the door open for future disassociation.
After linking Spain with Nazi Gv-srmany Roosevelt's prediction
that Nazi and "sir.iiliar ideolo.^es" would be extejnra-natod after Allied
victory casts the dark shadov; of a threat. As if to provide a path for
futura assault Roosevelt went on to qualify American non-interxerence
in foreign internal affairs, "unless there exists a threat to inter-
national peace," The question of exactly i7hat constitutes such a threat
would be debated at length in the future handling of the Spani.sh prob-
lem. But, according to President Roosevelt, the resolution of that
problsTi should be the "concern of the Spanish people," And, if they
should fail (to replace the Franco Government) they could have "no
place in the community of nations" and more, they could not expect
American help "in economic and other fields,"
The implication i7as clear; the people of Spain must act. They
must somehow rid themselves of their unacceptable government. Further,
they must act "soon" so that they might assume whatever responsibilities
that the United States would assign to them. Now that tho policy had




THE POLICY TAKES SHiiPE
Two weeks after the President's death the United Nations
Conference on International Organization opened in San Francisco.
Spain, who had never declared war on either Gennany or Japan xias
not eligible to attend.
During the session of June 19, the delegation from Mexico
requested that an interpretation be made concerning Article U,
Chapter II ofthe United Nations Charter, which states:
1, MeiTibership in the United Nations is open to
all other peace-loving states i-;lxLch accept the ob-
ligations contained in the present Cliarter and, in
the judgejnent of the Organization, are able and
Xidlling to cany out these obligations,
2, The adraissicn of any such state to merdbership
in the United Nations xdll be effected by a decision
of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of
the Security Council.-^-
Mention was roade of th© close relationship between Franco Spain
and Nazi Gennany and the representatives of Mexico submitted the
following interpretive commentarys
It is the understanding of the delegation of Mg:clco
that paragraph 2 of Chapter III (Article U, Chapter II,
of the Charter) cannot be applied to the States whose
regimes have been established \rith the help of militaiy
forces belonging to the countries which have waged war
against the United Nations, as long as those regiraes are
in power. 2
The United States Assistant Secretary of State» James Dunn moved[„ /
immediately to the support of the Mexican positions tAJ^xJ^:^HMi'>:./.








The United States delegation is in coraplete
accord xvrith the stata".ient of interpretation made
by the delegation of Mexico and desires to assoc-
iate itself with that declaration,
3
It is interesting to speculate on this example of parlia-
mentary finesse. The Mexican commentary seems almost a para-
phrasing of the policy suggested by Franklin Roosevelt, However,
had the United States introduced such an interpretation there
might well have been some objection from the normally pro-Spanish
Latin American nations. Indeed, only three, Chile, Guatemala, and
Uruguay rose to join the United States (and Australia, Belgium, and
the USSR), in support of adopting the interpretation.
Former Ambassador Hayes suggests that Mexico's initiative
stesnmed from pressure brought by Spanish Republican exiles living in
Mexico,^ It is true that about 1^0,000 Republican refugees did escape
to Mexico and other Latin American countries and in fact, Mexico was
the seat of the Republican Government in exile. Moreover, the
Mexican Government of the Civil War period was itsel£ derived from
a reaction against the aristocracy and the clergy and had therefore
actively assisted the Loyalists against Franco. President Lazaro
Cardenas defied the Non-intervention Agreement to send two milJLion
dollars worth of military aid to the Republican Government. By the
time ofthe San Francisco Conference, c£rdenas had been replaced by
the government of Avila Camacho who had worked with Washington
3u. S., Department of State, United Nations Conference on Inter-
national Orp;anization, San FrancihscOj) Califomiaq April 25 to June 2^,





to reduce fascist influence in the vxestem hanisphGre and to bring
Mexico into closer cooperation with the United States, Daring World
War II Mexico had even come to appreciate American Land-Lease (over
$38 million) and grants-in-aid.^ The extent to wliich Roosevelt's
Spanish policy nay or may not have influenced the Mexican delegation
Cannot be detenained xcLthout additional evidence. In any case, the
caumentary submitted by the Mo:d.cans was approved by the Conference,
In Britian meanwhile, a parallel policy had been developing in
regard to Spain, On May 2U 19hhi Churchill had been moved to praise
certain features of Franco 'd wartime conduct.
There is no doubt that if Spain had yielded to
Gennan blandishments and pressure ,., our burden
would have been much heavier , , , , In the dark days
of the war the attitude of the Spanish Governr,ient
in not giving our enemies passage throu^ Spain was
ex-tremely helpful to us. It was especially so at the
time of the North African liberation ,,. .1 must say that
I shall always consider a service xxas rendered at this
time by Spain not only to the British Enapire and Common-
wealth, but to the cause of the United Nations, I have
no sympathy therefore vjith those who ••, insult and abuse
the Government of Spain whenever occasion servos ,o
The tone of this speech and the success of the Allied armed forces
prompted an overture by Franco on October 18, 19hh% The Caudillo noted
with alarm the dual ascendancy of the United States and the Soviet
Union and suggested to Churchill a"grouping" of Spain and Britian,
Churchill replied (with copies to both Ropsevelt and Stalin) that;
SVor an interesting account o± the evolution of Mexican foreign
policy see Hovjard F, Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 3b7-U07,
^Lcxjis Broad, VJinston Churchill^ 187U-19^2 (London? Hutchinson
and Company, 19^2), pp. h9h'h95.
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Now that plans for the future of Europe and the
vxorld x^ere under consideration the British Govern-
ment could not overlook the constantly hostile
attitude of the Falangist Party and its close re-
lationship v/ith the Nazis and Fascists, ,,,
It vas out of the question for the British
Govcmracnt to support Spanish aspirations to partic-
ipatc in the future peace settlements. Neither was




I should be seriously nisloadin;;; you if I did
not at once remove any misconception that His
Majesty's Govorniaent a;fc^ prepared to consider any
grouping of Powers in VJestem Europe or elsewhere
on a basis of hostility toxjards, or of the alleged
necessity of defense against, our Russian allies.
The policy of Ilis Majesty's Government remains
firmly based upon the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 19U2
and they regard the continuance of Anglo-Russian
collaboration, xjithin the framex^ork of the future
world organisation, as essential^ not only to their
oxin interests, but also to the future peace cuad
prosperity of Europe as a whole ,^
It is clear then that when the United States and the Uriited
Kingdom arrived at Potsdam on July 17 19U5, their vie-^s on the Spanish
question \jQre roughly the same. The United States was, of course,
represented by Harry Truman in place of Franklin Roosevelt, but Mr,
Truman had been President less than one hundred days and had not begun
to alter the pattern of policy which his predecessor had arranged.
The third member of the Potsdam Conference also had views on the
Spanish question. To Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union Franco Spain
Was an undeclared belligerent enemy. After Hitler's break vxith Russia
Franco had seen his opportunity to mal<:e a committment in favor of the
Axis and against his arch ensTiy of the Civil VJar days. Mindful of the
YBroad^ VJinston Churchill^ p. 11.96
«
8u.S,S,R,, Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR and the Prime I4inisters of Great Britian, etc,. Vol. 1,
CMoscow; Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), pp. 395-396.
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Soviet assistance rendered to the Republicans, Franco, in September
19hl, presented Hitler ;vith an l8,000 man military unit, named for the
color of its shirts, the Blue Division, This grouji, allegedly of
Falangist volunteers, were to bo used by Qoravsny only on the eastern .
front. These volunteers have been variously describedj by some as
"a good hearted gang of exceptionally virile men" and by others as
"thieves and rapists."^ It is difficult to ascertain their real
military contribution, if any. In July 19U3, Ambassador Hayes took
it on himself to suggest strongly to Franco that an adventure such
as the Blue Division would be weighed more heavily by the VJestem
Powers as support of Hitler rather than as revenge against Stalin,**-^
By the following October the Division v/as on its way back to Spain,
Regardless of the true extent of the Spanish unit's militaiy effective-
ness, Stalin had been attacked within his borders by Spanish troops.
This, coupled with the knov;ledge of Franco's attempt to lure the
British into an anti-Soviet understanding provided the Russians x^ith
credible grievances to bring to the conference table.
At the very first session at Potsdam Stalin digressed from a
discussion of the agenda to bring the matter of Franco Spain before
the Allied leadership,-^ He expressed his opinion that the Spanish
regime did not originate in Spain but had been imported and forced on
the Spanish people by Germany and Italy, Stalin went on to declare
that he considered that regiine a danger to the United Nations and that
9£,-,i-.;et John Hughes, Report From Spain (New York: Heniy Holt, 19kl),
p. 2 "^'5.
•'•QHayes, Wartime Mission^ p, 1^9,
IlHarr^'- S, Traman, Memoirs By I-Iarry S. Troman (Garden City: Doubleday,
195$), Vol. 1, p. 3U7.
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ho thought it vjculd be x:g11 to create conditions that would enable the
Spanish people to establish the regL^ie they vxantcd. The problem was
formally placed on the conxcrenco agenda and at the third session
Prime I^inister Churchill stated his views, "He said that he X7as
against interfering in the affairs of a country which had not ir.olcsted
the Allies and believed it was a dangerous principle to broalc off
relations because of Spain* s internal conduct. He would deplore any-
thing that iTiight lead Spain back into civil vxar. He pointed out that
the United Nations Charter had a provision against interference in the
domestic affairs of a nation, and that it would be inconsistontj while
preparing to ratify that Charter^, to resort to action that would be
prohibited under it •"•^2
President Truraan follox^ed \d.th a similiar statement. He later
recalled in his memoirs that, "I made it clear that I had no love for
Franco and also that I had no desire to have any part in starting
another civil war in Spain, There had been enough wars in Europe,
I said that I Xirould be happy to recognize another government in Spain
but that I thought Spain itself must settle that question,13
Stalin, as Truman renembered, "said that this vjas no internal
affair, because the Franco regime had been imposed on the Spanish
people by Hitler and Mussolini, He said that he believed that his
colleagues had no love for Franco and that he did not propose to







sevGro a demonstration, he asked if there \^evo not some other more
flexible means by which the Big Three could let the Spanish people
know that the three governments were in sympatliy with the people of
Spain and not Franco •"'•^
Again, according to Troman, Churchill balked at breaking relations,
"He referred to the valuable trade relations which Britian maintained
x^ith Spain, Unless he were convinced that breaking relations would
bring about the desired results he did not want this old and well-
established trade viith Spain stopped, "-^
For the moment it seemed that the lines were drawn. No one of the
Big Three was sympathetic with the Franco regime. They were all desirous
of seeing it replaced, but not at the cost of another civil war. The
question was one of interpretation of Mhat action might constitute inter-
ference in Spain's internal affiirs, Churchill believed that breaking
diplomatic relations would constitute such interference (as well as
jeopardize British trade), Truman, unused to summit conferences,
seemed to be of the same opinion, but vjas p]«>bably less sure of his
ground, Stalin held the opposite opinion and, though he appeared
adamant, might settle for something less. According to Truman,
Churchill, with his customary stubbornness, pressed for an immediate
resolution of the discussion but, as Stalin seemed prepared to drag
out the matter Truman lost patience. The President told the other two
leaders that they could return to the problem at any time and, in any
case, that he "did not come there to hold a police couiTt hearing on




something that was already settled or which would eventually be
settled by the United Nations" and "that if they did not get to the
main issues I was going to pnck up and go home,"!^
But, as it turned out, it v;ould be Churcliill who ^Jould "pack
up and go home." On the morning of July 26, he found himself out of
offif!e and by such an ovenihelming vote of the British electorate
that he "did not xd.sh to remain even for one hour responsible for
their affairs. "-^"^ Indeed, he would later repudiate responsibility
"for any of the conclusions reached at Potsdara,"^^ However, it was
Churchill's argument that held siiray and the final conclusion con-
cerning Spain was much closer to the existing policy of Britian and
the United States than the strong line suggested by Stalin, In the
words of the Protocol (Section IX):
The three govemmoits feel bound however to make
it clear that they for their part would not favor any
application for membership put foru^rai^i by the present
Spanish Government, i;hich, havirig been founded x^rith the
support, of the A:cis Povxero, does not, in view of its
origins, its r^ature, its record, and its close associa-
tion vxith the aggressor States, possess the qualifications
necessary to justify such membership, -^^^
Thus, an article of faith enumerated in Churchill's letter to
Franco (of October 19U;), Roosevelt's letter to Armour (of Mardil9U5),
and the Mexican commentary at San Francisco had been nailed down,
Spain was not wanted in post war international organization as long
as the Franco Government remained in power. It would remain for future
l^Truiuan, MeinoirSa pp. 3>9-36o.
^TWinston S, Churchill, The Second VJorld Uar (Abridged ed,, London:
Casse?Ll, 1959), p. 9^0.
i^ibid., p. 9Uri.
19u, S,, Senate Comr>iittee en Foreign Relations, A Decade of American
Foreign Policy/, Basic Doc-gmentSs 19Ul''19U9 (Washington, 1950), p. i;5»
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debates to decide what else, if anythlr^, would bo done to h.asten




THE INITIATIVE PASSES TO EUROPE
Throughout the closing monthc of World War II tho Franco Govern-
ment had of course discemed the strength and direction of the pre-
vailing vxindc. In an effort to provide at least a shovi of movement
towards becoming the kind of government that inight be palatable to the
Allies Franco took a series of steps. On July 13 19h^g ho fired Jose
Luis Arrese, an ardent Falangist, from his post as Secrotaly-General
of the Party,^ Four days later Franco announced that his Cortes had
passed a Fuero de los Sspanoles, a bill of rights. Although the
bill contained such basic points as no incomraunicado detainment, no
search xvithout warrent, universal eligibility to hold public office,
freedom of religion, and freedom of speech, the rights v/ere so
hedged \T±xh exceptions and provisos as to be of little real value. •
Also, on July 17, Franco revealed that it was his intention to re-
store to Spain "the traditional monarch" but not until "some future
2date" which was left indefinite.
Next, a neiT cabinet vias fonned which contained only two members
of the Falange, The role of the Party was changed from a state polit-
ical orgariization to an adirdnistrativo "instrament of national unifi-
cation," On July 27, the Vice-Secretariat of Popular Education, which
controlled propaganda, v?as taken out of the Falange structure and
placed under the Ministry of National Education,-^ Bat even had the
iCuvrent History
^
Sepoe..:b(;r 19U^, p« 26U,
^Current History, Decerrxber 19U3, p. 536,





Big Three, then meeting at Potsdam, known of these moves it is
doubtful that they would have been significantly impressed,
VJould the quarantine of Spain from the United Nations now lead
to other actions? In response to this question Truman's Secretary of
Stato, James Byrnes, said on August 22 19U5,
Wo change in United States policy toward Spain
would be announced except that policy ijhich was made
plain at Potsdam. Etiono-.r.ic policy would be changed
only where it would bo helpful to the United States
and lirhere it \Jould promote the peace of Europe.^
Indeed, in the months folloiri.ng Potsdam the United States was much
too busy mopping up Japan, daMobilizing its giant military machine, and
getting adjusted to living with the Piassians to allow itself to be con-
cerned with Spain. The nexb move, when it camo, would be made by France,
During the period of Gcrraan occupation in France the Communist
Party had contributed greatly to the Resistance Movement and at the
end of the vxar many departements throughout the country found them-
selves controlled by bands of amied and disciplined reds. Even General
DeGau3J.e, i-jrho bore the Communists no love, x^as unable to exclude them
from entering the Provisional Government in force. In the election of
October 21 19h5, the Communists polled over five million votes and the
socialists over four and a half million; together, exactly fifty per-
cent of the entire electorate. The Ca.imunist Parby demanded, and
received five cabinet posts, controlling the whole economic structure
of France, Moreover, they exerted great pressure on DsGaulle for the
top three portfolios. Foreign Affairs, VJar, and Interior, On January 20,
'^, S., Department of State Bulletin, August 26, 19^5 » P« 28U.
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19h6, DeG-aulle resigned fron the Provisional Gover'aiient and was
replaced by Georges Bidault^ Four weeks later, on February 27, the
French Gcvera^eiit foririally requested the support of the United States
in bringing before the United Nations Security Council the question of
"certain recent developments" in Spain, The Doparbment of State replied
that such support could not be given because "the Govcmraent of the
United States does not believe that a situation exists ;, the contin-
uation of vjhich is li.kely to endanger the laaintenance of international
peace and security,"" On March 1 19h6j, before this exchange liad been
completed^, France closed the Pyrenees frontier and broke off diplo::natic
and trade relations vjith Spain, On the same day, in VJashington, the
Honorable Charles Savage of the House of Representatives introduced
House Resolution $39 which claimed that:
1) the present regirae in Spain was exposed as being
guilty of plotting against the nilitar/ security of the
United Nations,
2) the Nazi-Falange regime has permitted over one
hundred Gevmsia cartel factoides to be established in Spain,
3) Nazi scientists are at vjork on atomic energy projects
in laboratories in Spain,
U) German cartel managers are plar*ning a third World VJar
against the democracies.
and resolved.
to urge tho President to protect American lives and
security by immediately declar-ing an embargo ••• uiitil the
Franco regirae is replaced by a democratic Spanish government,?
In retrospect, the French actions and the Savage Resolution seera
i?An interesting; ac-ouni; ci this period is given in Alexander Worth,
France, 19l'0-19g5 (London: Robert Ilale, 1956), pp. 273-293,
oj. if,, Deparbment of Str.to Bulletin , Vol. XIV, p. liGo,




perfectly in keepiiv^ xiith the prevaillnf^ interix-^itional accord on the
Spanish question. During the First Session of the United Nations
General Asaembly (January 10 to February lb, 19ii6), which had ;5ust
come to a close in London, the Menbers had accepted a Panantixdan
resolution endorsing the anti-Franco statoiisnts raade at San Francisco
and Potsdaia, and recommending tliat "the Members of the United Nations
should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these
statements in the conduct of their future relations vdth Spain. "S
No doubt the French Gover/inent believed that it 'i^as acting in
accordance ;d.th the "spirit" of Sail Francisco and Potsdam when it
closed its frontier and tried to bring Franco before the Security
Council. Representative Savage must certainly have felt that he too
was acting in the "spirit," Indeed, at the London session, the Soviet
Union had acted to bar Spain (as a non-Member of the United Nations)
from receiving aid under the nex-xly established United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration zind no nation had seriously objected
to that .9
But the wording of the Panamanian resolution was dangerously
vague and already France had gone beyond whatefver limits the U. S.
Department of State had in mind. In order to unify and define their
views the three goverjrments. Great Britian, France, and the United
States released, on March h 19U6, a Tripartite Statement.
It is agreed that so long as General Franco continues
in control of Spain, the Spanish people cannot anticipate






fiill aiid cordial association Xxrith those nations of
the world xvhich have, by coiiimon effor-b brought defeat
to QeiTaan Nazism and Italian Fascisiiij, ^^liich aided the
present Spanish regirae in its rise to powor and after
which the regime was patterned.
There is no intention of interfering^ in the internal
affaii'^ of Spain ... , On the contra i^r it is hoped that
leading patriotic aiid IjLberal-mindGd Spanj.ards nay soon
find means to bring about a peaceful xd.thdra;:al of Franco,
the abolition of the Falange^, and the establislriment of an
interim or caretaker gororruiiont undor irhich tlio Spanish
people may have an opportunity freely to determine the type
of govenoment they >7ish to have and to choose their
leaders. Political amnesty^ return of exiled Spaniards,
frecdoi.i of assembly, and political association and
provision for free public elections are essential. An
intcriaa goveniMent which would be and would rcaiiain
dedicated to these ends should receive tlie recognition
and support ox all frecdom~loving peoples.
Such recognition xTOuld include full diploroatic relations
and the taking of such practical measures to assist in the
solution of Spain's economic probler.is as may be practicable
in the circumstances prevailing. Such measures are not now
possible, -^^
Ar.ibassador Axmour had resigned in Wovanber 19hSj, and no successor
had been appointed, Nov; it v^ds clear why not. The three Western Powers
were going to gamble that a policy of isolating Spain diplomatically
and econor,iically (in so far as they could) viould shako Franco's hold
on the country vrlthout starting another civil war. Perhaps ir Franco
weal-cened, even a little, some ''patriotic and liberal-minded" Spaniards
might be found to bloodlossly depose hira and his govemraent and liis
political party, Dospite the bluahir^ protest that there was "no
intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain" the policy
of the West had now ^11 but coma to riiatch the views of Stalin at
Potsdam,
By way of justification of this extension in policy the Department
"^'"^'Jm S,, Deparxmeni, of 6oato l^ulietina I'iarch 17 19h6g p. I;12,
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of Stato issued, together xd.th the text of the Tripartite Statement,
a little booE:let containing copies of official Gorman documents under
the title. The Spanish G-overnmont and the Axis . Knox-m as the "VJhite
Paper on Spain" this booklet of captured material illustrated the
depth and character of Franco's involvement with Hitler and Mussolini,
Now it was obvious that the proper "conduct of future relatipns
with Spain" was to have no relations xd-th Spain, However, there was '^''<' '*'' -^ ^ X^
,
already some evidence of resistance to this program. In the House of
Representatives the Honorable VJilliara Barry took exoeption,
, , . if x-je are to break off diplomatic relations
Xrri.th Spain because the Spanish Government , , . x-jas
pro-Axis ,,. x-Jhat about Soviet Russia x-jhich not only
collaborated x»Jith Hitler in starting the war, but took
half of Poland as a pay off and then attacked and
seized a part of tiny Finland? Are x^re going to estab-
lish one principle for Sixain because she is x-:eak and
the Communists do not like her, and another for Russia
because she is strong?^
The ansxvrer seemed to be, "Yes." On April 8 19U6, the Polish
representative to the United Nations requested the Security Council
examine the situation arising from the existence and activities of
the Franco regime in Spain, Poland claimed that such existence and
activities "have led to international friction and endangered inter-
national peace and security, "-^^ Poland moved that all nations who
maintained diplomatic realtions with the Franco Government sever
them immediately* "J^be Polish position was supported by France,
Mexico and the Soviet Union, but Great Britian xias concerned that
any collective action taken might interfere xd.th matters that were
^U. S,, Congressional Record^ 79th Cong,, 1st sess,. Vol, 91,
pt. 13, p. A5ij7l
12United Nations, Yearbook for 19U6-19ii7, p. 3ij5.
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iritliin domestic jurisdiction. A sub-coramitteo iJas ce'c up to invcsti-
gal7e the Franco resifi^'Q and to deten^iine "whethGr or not an actual
threat to uorld peace existed. The Gub-covn/irittee subroitted its ropojr'b
on June 6 19U6, VJhile it \ms able to confiitn the facts leading to the
San Francisco and Potsdam decisions ^ it could not find cause j, under the
rules of the United Nations Charter, for the kind of action that Poland
had proposed. There had been no breach ofthe peace, no act of aggression
had been proven, and no threat to the peace of the world had been estab-
lished.
By the follox-d-ng December the Polish delegation had shifted its
attack to the General Asscaubly of the United Nations, "The situation
in Spain had deteriorated" since June, according to the Poles, and now
it was imperative that "the General Assembly should recommend that each
Member of the U.N, tersidnate forthwith diplomatic relations vd.th the
Franco regime, "^3 in addition, the Byelorussian representative sub-
mitted an amendment to the Polish resolution to the effect that economic
relations be terminated as viell.
Although these suggestions seemed to confomi remarkably va.th the
program expressed by France, Britian, and the United States in their
Tripartite Statement of March, neither Britian or the United States
were anxious now, in December, to see them adopted by the United Nations,
Senator Tom Connally, appearing before the Political and Security
Committee ofthe General Assembly, expressed the feeling that the
teimination of diplomatic relations with Spain would only result in
"cutting off the Spanish people from communication xiith the rest of the
13United Nations, Yearbook for 19h6-19U7, p. 127.
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world" and that terminating economic relations would produce "economic
and political chaos ••• which could not be prevented from degenerating
into civil vjar v/ith serious international complications,"!^
Britian, who had no objection to brealcing off diplomatic relations
(they tv-ithdra-T their Ambassador the folloiring month) opposed a recom-
mendation (by France) that Members should put an end to imports of
Spanish foodstuffs and other products on the grounds that such measures
would interrupt channels of trade and lox^er the food standards of the
British people.
The United States, in a compromise effort, submitted a resolution
recommending that Spain be excluded from membership in the United
Nations or any into:*national agency related to it. Since the United
Nations had already officially endorsed the piTohibitions made at San
OFrancisco and Potsdam this resolution could only be a suDerfluous o/
gesture. However, on Deceraber 12 I9U6, the General Assembly adopted A^ ^ ^
a resolution conderiining the Franco Government as a guilty party with ^^ ^^
Hitler and Mussolini, debarririg that Govenitient from membership in '^^^^
international agencies established by or brought into relationship
with the United Nations, and from participation in conferences or
other activities which may be arranged by the United Nations, and
recom:riending that all Members imraediately recall their ambassadors
and ministers accredited to Madrid. -^^ "In the interests of harmony
and of obtaining the closest possible approach to unanimity in the
General Assembly on the Spanish problem" ^^^ ^*^- ^otod for the resolution.^^
-l-Uu.S., Department of S-b?.te Bulletin
,
Deceniber 15 s 19^6^ p, IG860
l^United Nations, Yearbook for 19h6-19h7
,
pp. 129-130,
l6u. S., Senate Comirdttee, A Decade
^ p. 890.

YSPAIN IS SEEN IN A HEJ PERSPECTIVE
VJhy had the United States tried to side step the iinplementation
of the Tripartite Statement? Vihat had transpired between the signing
of the Statement in March and the adoption of the United Nations
resolution in December? The answer is that during those ten months
the opening skinnishes of the Cold Viar had taken place. On J-Iarch
2 I9U6, the Soviet Union violated its agreement to evacuate its
troops from Iran and began supplementing its forces there. On
March $, VJinston Churchill reminded the United States ofthe extent
to i^iich the Russians had pashed their influence in liis "iron
curtain" speech at Fulton, 24is scurf. . On March 26, the Russian
representative on the Allied Control Council in occupied Genriany
blocked all furt.her flow of farm products from the agricultural
Soviet Zone to the industrial Western Zones, thus preventing
Germar^r from becoraing a single economic unit as had been agreed
at Potsdam,-^
In April Molotov dismissed plans proposed by the United States
for the drafting of a German peace treaty. In June the Russians
deadlocked the American attempt to establish an International
Atomic Development Authority,^ On into the summer and fall the
lln September, I9U6, Secretary of State Byrnes, in an address
September 1$ I9U6, pp, U96-501,
2For further details in this period ox breal^doom in East~VJest
relations see, Richard E, Lcorcld, The Gro-trth of American Foreign




chasin bat-waen East, and VJqso
-'ri.dc5nGdp Tha Truman adr,iinis-tra.uion
elected to pursue a hard lino T,n.th the Rassians and in Soptciiiber
the President's dismissal of Kenry VJalloce from his cabinet
demonstrated that it vjas no longer fashionable to bo indulgent
towards communism. As intormtional cooperation took its first
stops to^jardp international co-e:d.3tenco tho residual throat of
fascism Tjas eclipsed and American statesmen began to realize that
they could no longer afford the luxury of "extenainating" fascist
systems ^rhen such extermiiiation might turn a profit for the
Soviet Union.
By spring, 19^7, it ;vas clear tliat tho United States must
direct its effcris to;^^rd the forceable containment of coifimunisra,
ar*d on May 22, in the passage of the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill,
peacetime roilitaiy assistance was adopted for the first time as
a regular tool of diplomacy. But, if VJestern Birope, close to
economic chaos, was not to fall helplessly into coi'nmunist hands
much more than military assistance xvould be required.
The iXiropean Recovery Program (the Marshall plan), as visual-
ized by William Clayton, Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, and Secretary of State Marshall, would provide the spark
needed to rekindle the furnaces of capitalism within the European
States. A healthy system of free enterprize xiould soon become its
own best defense against the incursions and temptations of communism.
In order to pursue the program without aggrav;iting the split vd.th the
Soviet Union the initiative \^as passed to the European nations
i^'ruman. Memoirs 3 pp, 555-^60,
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themselves and most particularly to Great Britian and Fiance,
Although Secretary Marshall had eoiphasiaed at his Harvard speech
of June $ I9U7, that this American policy teas "dire^.ted not against
any country or doctrine/^ British Foreign Secretary Bovin and French
Foreign Minister Bidault pointedly neglected to invite Spain's
participation in the Committee of European Economic Cooperation
•which they formed three weeks later. Even the Soviets ar^d all their
satellites were asked to ;3oin but, ever distrustful of American motives,
they declined.
As the Marshall plan moved beyond the stage of CEEC estimates
and began to take shape as legislation (the Foreign Assistance Act of
I9i;8), qaestions were raised in Congress concerning the omission of
Spain, On March 12 19U8, Senator Smith of New Jersey (a member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) responded to such an inquiry
in these words:
VIq did not select the nations which joined the
agreement , . , . The question was considered originally
,,, by France and England, They invited the other nations
to participate. As I recall, they left out Spain. We had
nothing to do with that. That was their move ... .We had
nothing to do with the selection of the countries ,,.
In order to illustrate the slight degree of U, S, involvement in
this decision concerning the spending of billions of American
dollars Senator Smith went on to quote from the CEEC report (section
8, Page 13):
Of all the sovereign states of Europe, Spain was
iiu.b,. Department of 5taoe B-glletin, June 15 19U7, Pp. Il59-1160,
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the only one -which -was not extended an invitation to
attend the Paris conference. From an ocononic point of
view Spain iTii,iht be able to m^ike a contribution to r/ach
a progra^-n. On the other hand, due to the nature of the
Franco regime, and due to the resolutions adopted at
various interniitional conferences, the CEEC countries
at the Paris conference did not believe it appropriate
or consistent xjith the spirit of such resolutions to
invite Spain to po.rticipat8 at that tirae«
Whether she eventually tcikcs part in the prograra
Tcill depend on hor otm idllin^ness to asnuiae the ob-
ligations involved, the xjillingness of the partici-
pating couni7ries to admit her, and the ability of Spain
to conclude a satisfactory bilateral agreement with the
United States .5
The CEEC then, under the leadership of Bevin and Bidault, had
excluded Spain "due to the nature of the Franco regime, and due to
the resolutions adopted at various international conferences •" By
thir, they could only mean that, l) thje fascist Spanish Government
was totalitarian and underaocratic, wliich of course it ins, and 2)
that the Sjxinish Government had been conder.ined and debarred at
San Francisco, and at Potsdam, and by the Tripartite Statement and
the United Nations resolution for its close association with the
^AxLs, which of course it had been.
The CEEC admission that Spain might be able to make a contribution
to the European Recovery Program \ras confirraed by Senator Dennis Chavez,
Spain is the only nation in Western Europe vjhich
today is exporting food. Three mllion tons of food-
stuffs are shipped annually from Spain, That amount
vjould be increased to nine million tons if ne could
assist her i^rith credits for farm machinery and fertil-
izer, and that would releave the strain on our oim
agricultural production and shipping,^
bU.3,^ Con;-fx-csf?ional Rccc->~8oth Cong., 2d sess.. Vol, 9U, pt, 2,
p. 2617.




During Senate hearings Mr. Mervin K. ?Iart, President of the
National Econoinic Council, testified.
The present Spanish Government long since paid
not only all foreign loans contracted by its govern-
ment, but also those contracted by the Republic beforo
it.,, , Cc;7ipared with the countries to which the
Marshall plan proposes to extend loans, Spain would be
a first class credit risk,?
In addition Mr, Hart raised an issue that had begun to appeal to others,
Spain has been clearly left out through deference
to the communistic influence throughout Europe and in
our o^iin GoverniTient, especially the State Department ,°
But the number one man in the State Department, Secretary
Marshall, had already testified hinself that.
There is nothing in the bill, as we s^ , that prevents
that L__giving Spain the right to the same beneficial arrange-
ments offered to the Soviet Union]]!, but you have a general
situation over there in the economic accord of these nations
Tirhere they, on their o;^ initiative, decided not to invite
Spain to participate. That was decided by them and not by us,^
Marshall would later go on record as having no objection to including
Spain in the list of countries to receive aid under the Marshall plan,-^
One of those puzzled by Secretary Marshall's suggestion that a
lack of "economic accord" had prompted European exclusion of Spain
was the Honorable Representative of Wisconsin, Alvin E, O'Konski, who
reminded the House that Great Britian had ;5^st asked for and received
a two year credit of ten million pounds sterling from Franco.-*-^ (France
7'J.S,, Congressional Hearinc^s , Senate Forcig'n Relations Coi-,raittee,
8oth Cong,, 19ii7-19iib, Vol, 2, (January 2k, 19l;8), po Q7h»
Qroid,3 Po 873«
9lJ,S,, Congressional Hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Both Cong., 19i;7-19Ub, Vol. 2, (January 12, 19ii8), p. 102.





at this time was about to conclude a new Trade and Payments Agreement
with Spain), Recalling Marshall's words that the policy embodied in
the program -ws-s "directed not against any country or doctrine" O'Konski
questioned the right of the CEBC to deny Spain Ainerican aid under the
plan, and the logic of explaining that denial (as the CELC's report had
done) on the basis of "the nature of the Franco regime" and its associ-
ation with the Axis. If the Government of Spain tjas totalitarian and
undemocratic wore not the Governments of Russia and her satellites
also totalitarian and undemocratic? Participation in the plan had
been offered to them, had it not? If Spain had been closely assoc-
iated with the Axis Powers, what of Italy, who had been an Axis Power?
Now Italy was to be included in the CEEC, If the underlying purpose
of the Foreign Assistance Act ;^s to build a Europe healthy enough
to resist communism why refuse to aid the one country that had
completely driven communism from its territory?
By what rule of logic should Spain be excluded? ... ,
To eliminate Spain from this bill is nothing but shameful
and stupid appeasement of the pinkos in Moscoxj and the
pinkos in our own State Department and Department of
Commerce ,^2
Being the President of the American Anti-Communist Organization
and the Director of the World League to Stop Comraunism, O'Konski's
interest sind point of view are not surprising, KouGVor;, there were
many others in American government who shared at least some of 0*Konski's
bevdlderment at the administration's unquestioning acceptance of the
CEEC's authority to make exclusive exceptions to an American aid pro-
gram. On March 12 19^8^, Servitor Homer Capehart queried the former
Chairr.ian of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom Connally,




about this and received the reply, "Spain has not boen playing along
much in foreign relations lately, I do not know e^cactly 'v;hy."13
Senator C^pehart might have replied that any nation publically
debarred from the United Nations and all international agencies,
having seen its diplomatic relations reduced (or broken off entirely),
and its trade restricted might reasonably be accused of failure to
"play along." Instead, possibly troubled by the sudden fall of
Eduaivi Benes. and the comraunist coup in Czechoslovakia of two weeks
before, Capehart wondered aloud why.
We are told by the able Senator from Texas jConnally]
and the able Senator from Michigan j Arthur Vandenbergg then
Cliairman of the Foreign Relations Committee ^ and the Secretary
of State, and the President of the United States that we are
going into this program to stop conrnunismo Yet the one nation
in Europe that stopped communism | Franco Spain" is not a part
of the program.1^
One ofthe prerequisites for Spanish membership, as given by the
CeeC, was "her oi-m willingness to as^ame the obligations involved."
VJa«? Spain i-jilling to par-bicipate? How did Spain feel about her ex-
clusion from the program? £Lberto Artajo, Franco's Minister for
Foreign Affairs described it as "mortifying." In a speech before the
Cortes describing the various economic sanctions talcen against Spain,
he said^
The most important one o.. liias to keep us out of
the generous economic aid given by AmeirLca to Ehrope,
and to which we were as much entitled as any other
country of the Old Continent, if that aid wss to bo
givenj, as the Act proclaimed^ to raise Europe out of
her penury; and to x>iiiich vie had a much better right if.





as was afteniards stated, the real aim of the Marshall
Plan was to fight Coinmunisra.
3y the denial of that aid, vq were doubly injured:
first, because we were deprived of the necessary means
of rapid econoniic recovery and of our very subsistencej
and next 5 because, by strengthening the neighbouring
oconoinios of VJestern Europe in comparison with our
irapoverished one with a stream of over ten thousand
iTiillion dollars, they placed us in a situation of
cornraercial inferiority in conseqaonce of which a large
part of the Spanish goods that vjere traditionally
exported to ••• other European countries xjqtq totally
displaced from those roarkets, tjhile we were deprived
of their counterparts, because, naturally, it \<ia.s much
easier for those countries to import goods fi'ee of
expense to themselves with the Marshall dollars in
which they abounded, -^^
If then, as we have noted, Spain would have been most willing
to have become a recipient of Marshall plan aid (and indeed was already
economically involved with the leaders of the CEEC), and the Secretary
of State had voiced tallingness to include her as such a recipient,
why was she not included? If the aid \<ias for the needy, Spain was
needy; if the aid was to bolster anti-cominunisra, Spain ijas certainly
anti-comraunist, VJhy was she not qualified?
Representative O'Konski decided to address himself to these
questions by proposing an amendiient adding Spain to the list of
nations that would receive the benefits of the Foreign Assistance Act.
The limited debate in the Hqusq over O'Konski's amendment brou^t
forth only the familiar protests (from Representatives Isacson, and
Holifield) about Franco's association vrith and support of the Axis
Powers, the Falangist activities in Latin America, the "program of
Spanish territorial expansion," and the "atomic research being
J-i^Spain, The Folic?/- of ^eolation of S^ain Followed by the United
Nations From 19U^ to 19>Q ^-ladridj Qficina de Informacion Diplomatica,
1950), i;p. 18-19.

conducted in Spain by Gcrmo.n scientists," Apparently unimpressed by
another airing of these cliarses, the House voted, lh9 to S2^ for
ax)proval of the amendment and the inclusion of Spain, ''-^ But^ resard-
less of the decision of the House of Representatives, the inclusion
was not to be made.
On April 1, ti;o days after the House vote, an editorial in th©
WasMngton Star observed that.
It is claimed
J,
for e:cimple, that the bid to Franco
to return to the democratic family, coming at this time
nay si-ring a riiillion doubtful votes into the Comiiiunist
coluTiin in the forthcoming Italian election. If there
is any truth in this, then it obviously" uould be un-
wise to go through with the invitation to Spain,17
A nei-j refinement in United States foreign policy had begun
swelling and taking shape as early as the previous January, and
was now rising rapidly to the surface. The Star editorial vjas
one indicator ofthe immediate presence of this refinement.
On January 13 19hb, P'oreign Secretary Bevin had informed Secretary
Marshall and President Truman of Britian's intention to approach France
and the Benelux nations with a scries of bilateral defense agreements.
Heartened by the British initiative, Truman promised his "wholehearted
sympathy" and followed by detailing Under Secretary of State Robert
Lovctt and Senator Arthur Vandenberg to open negotiatiorxS with the
"Western Europeans,^^ On ^larch 17, the proposed bilateral agreements
were reduced, at Brussels, to one collective, self-defense pact.
i^o.S,, ConKreDGiOiial Records oOth Cong,, 2d sess,. Vol. 9h, pts,
2,3, pp. 370ii-3705, 3911.
-i-
1 .."ashington Star^ editorial, April 1, 19^8,
I^i'ruman, Memoirs, Vol, 2, p, 2U3.
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The oxistence of this pact at once drcj; a clear military line
across Earopo and the iraplication to tho Russians could not bo
nistaken. Some sort of reply vas certain and, in fact^ General
Clay had already cabled from Berlin that he had detected "a subtle
change" in the Russian attitude which made hin feol that -trcir "r.iay
come with dramatic suddenness. "-^9 The Truraan administration ms
naturally anxious to inflate the Brussels Pact into come kind of
viable defense force as quickly as possible; first, by allying the
United States X'Jith the Pact, and second, by bringing in as many
other nations as were mutually acceptable. The positive align-
ment of Italy, due to her strategic position, became of immediate
importance and the communists could not be allowed to pull her
away into their cam.p. If Italian communists could point to an
entente between th© Western Powers and Franco, an old crony of
the passionately discredited Kussolini and the hated Gerraan Piihrer>
they might just succeed in winning the seat of goverm-aent in Rome,
or at least in preventing any other Italian Goverrrniant from joining
the Wesb ,
As the Congressional Joint Conference Comr.-iittee met in
Washington to consider the final form of the Foreigh Assistance Act
of 19ii8, the Russians were beginning to detain Allied military trains
enroute to Berlin and to restrict freight movement cut of the city.
The pressure x-Jas on.
On April 2, Senator Vandenberg, xjho had managed the Foreign
l^Leopold, Grovrth of A:r.orican Foreign Policy, p. 653*
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Assistance Act in the Upper House, made the rollox-Jing statements
The Senate may be inteiKJsted in knovjin-ig that the
Coni'crccs rcTiovel rrora the bill the recognition of
Spain as a participating^ countiy, as voted origin-
ally \'j^ the House, It ixag the attitude of the Senate
Conferees - and the House Conferees ultimately agreed
- tiiat the riCmbership in the Dj.ropean RccovGir/ Prograra
is an autonomous institution of it own, that the 16
European parfcicipntrl.ng countries are the ones who control
the right of membership in their cooperative uc:/cnture
and that it is not for us to undcitake to dictate the
membership. It is for that reason^ fundamentally^
t-Jithout passing upon the merits of the question itself,
that the Spanish amendment was eliminated, ^0
To those x-jho had championed Spain's right to a partnership in
the international family of nations this seemed to be the ultimate
rejection, the high xjater mark in exclusion. In time, the extent
and depth of the cor.munist conspiracy x^dthin the United States
vjould be defined and then such ciiies as the presence of Alger Iliss
on the Executive Comrrdttee for the Marshall Plan rrdght serve as an
indicator of subversive activity behind that particular frustration
of Spanish hopes. However, it is not Trjithin the scope of tlu.3 pape^
to attempt a determination of that elusive undercurrent in United
States foreign policy.
Rather, it xJould seem mere proper to suggest that, on the evidence,
the threat of imriiinent East-VJest hostilities had caught American policy
towards Spain in mid-strearaj that the gradual shift of emphasis ax-reiy
from anti-fascism and towards sjiti-communism had suddenly accelerated,
rapidly eclipsing al?^ other considerations. The '.^fnole Spanish problem
was suddenly cut of date, as fears about iipjaginary atomic research in
•^•^U.S,, Ccngressional ilccord, 6oth Cong,, 2d soss,. Vol, 9U, pt. 3,
p, U03Ii.

Spain tumod into fears of real nuclear weapons in Russia, It doos
not seem unreasonable to assume that during this period of crisis
Jtoorican statesmen might find it expedient to shun Franco Spain in
the interest of haiinony vjithin the Atlantic community. After all,
Spain would not - could not - "go away." There ara.s no fear of
Franco joining the communists and, if war should come, the Spanish
Government would be the first to recognize that everything possible
must be done to keep th© Russians far from the Pyrenees,
President Truman tells us in his memoirs that although it was
suggested at a meeting of the National Security Council in May, 19U8,
that Spain be given a role in the forthcoming North Atlantic Treaty,
the Berlin blockade that began in e:;:mest the following month brought
postponement of any factor that might cause argument or delay in the
21fashioning of the alliance. Once the alliance was established how-
ever, on April k 19U9, no invitation could be extended to Spain with-
out the unanimous consent of all the members. Being loath to discuss
divisive issues, the NATO members were hardly likely to enter into
serious debates about Spanish membership.
So now, in the spring of 19U9, although few Americans could
believe that Spain represented any real menace, the United States
and its VJestern European allies had isolated Franco and his country
as much as they could from international relationships, Spain t;as
debarred from the United Nations, found ineligible for participation
in the Marshall plan, and too controversial for membership in NATO.
By 19h9, none of these exclusions really made any sense. Certainly
they and various other sanctions had not had the desired effect of
toppling the Franco Government,
^ITromans Heiioirs, Vol, 2^ p, 2k':i,
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Before ho resigned from the Cabiiist, Secretary Marshall had
admitted that "the United Nations ban on accrediting ambassadors
to Franco is no longer justified. "^2 ^ut Marshall's successor.
Dean Acheson, was not quite ready to admit that in its policy
tox-jard Spain the United States
-was already simply going through
the motions of implementing an anachronism. In May 19h9f x-jhon
four South American countries submitted a resolution before tha
United Nations calling for full freedom of action of members in
their relations with Spain, Acheson instructed the United States
delegation to abstain from the voting, thereby contributing to the
failure of the resolution. By vjay of explanation, Acheson said.
It seems perfectly clear to the Wes"fcern European
countries that you cannot have an intimate working
partnership xjith such a regime "[as Franco 'sj in the
economic field and in the defense field.
United States policy is a policy directed tovrard
working id.th the Spaniards ar^d vri.th the VJestem
Europeans, bringing about a situation vjhere these
fundamental liberties [ habeas corpus^ religious free-
dom, right of association, etc. ) do exist in Spain
and where the VJestem Europeans can bring Spain into
the community.2^
It is Strang© that Acheson, \Jho had seen the United States and
Great Britian involve themselves in an "intimate x^orking partner-
ship" with the Soviet Union (a regime infinitely more ruthless than
Franco's), and do so ic.th success against a common enemy, could make
such a statement. It is stranger still, that as late as spring, 19U9,
an American Secretary of State could feel free to indulge in the
luxury of choosing allies by the amount of personal liberty they
allowed their citizens.
^^Hayojj Ths Uiiitcd S-Q-to:; and Spiling p. 163.
23U.S., Department of State Press Release, May 11, 19h9.
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THE SPAT^ISH POLICY IS RE^TERSED
On September 23 19h9, President Traman informed the American
people that the Soviet Union had broken the United States monopoly
on nuclear devices, and in the Pentagon "big bomber" men began
measuring distances to the Russian heartland. The scramble for
advanced bases was not far in the future,
A little more than three months after the Soviet atomic
explosion Secretary Acheson was ready to redefine his position on
Spain, In a letter to the now Chaiiroan of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Tom Connally, Acheson reviewed briefly the post war policy
which the United States had been following and he took care to empha-
size that American support of the 19h6 anti-Franco resolution in th©
United Nations had been less than wholehearted.
5^4Experience since that time has served to confina,^^
our doubts about these recomraeddations. They were
intended as a gesture of disapproval and an atterapt^^-,
to bring about a change in the Spanish Government, "'^'r^"
In retrospect, it is now clear j, however^ that this
action has not only failed in its intended purpose
but has served to strengthen the position of the
present regime,
1
The Secretaiy then explained that the United States had adhered
to the recommendations in order to lend support to the United Nations,
but now, in January 19^0,
In our view, the mthdraaral of Ambassadors from
Spain as a means ox ]Jolitical pressure was a mistaken
departure from established principle,
ig.S,^ Dcpartriient oTstgce BullGtin
,





It is the opinion of this Government ths.t the
anomalous situation xdth respect to Spain should
be resolved. The United States is therefore pre-
pared to vote for a resolution in the General
Assembly 'tjhich i-ri-ll leave nembers free to send an
Ambassador or I-Iinister to Spain if they choose.
additionally.
,,, \<!Q ijould favor the amendment of the 19l;6
resolution of the General Assembly to permt
specialiaed agencies to admit Spain to meiaber-
ship if
J,
in the opinion of the specialized
agencies, Spanish membership xjould contribute
to the effective x-jork of these organizations.
We believe that membership in these agencies
should be determined, to the extent practicable,
on the technical and nonpolitical basis.
Acheson was anxaous to streos that.
These conclusions by the United States
Government do not iriiply any change in the basic
attitude of this Government tox:ard Spain,
but rather, wore.
,,, based on the recognition of certain essential
facts. First, there is no sign of an alternative to
the present GovernjTient.
Second, the internal position of the regime is
strong and enjoys the support ofmany x^^ho, although
they might prefer another form of government or
chief of state, fear that chaos and civil strife
would follow a move to overthrow the Government,
Third, Spain is a p;ari: of Western EUrope which
should not be permanently isolated from normal
relations with that area.
After reiterating the desirability of seeing fundamental liberties
extended to the people of Spain^ and the various difficulties attendant
to Spanish cooperation with the other Western European nations, Acheson

laid the ground-x'ork for econoirdc assistance to the Franco Government,
United States econonic policy to^nrd Spain is
directed to the development of mutually beneficial
econcraic relations^ This policy is based on purely
econcmic, as distinct from political^ grounds, Wo
believe that private business and barJcing arran^c-
ncnts and trade activities with Spain should be con-
ducted on a free and noxinal basis. The Department
--c:.
'^
intei'*posed no political objections and restrictions y "^
on such activities, "^ ^;
So far as economic assistance from this Govenir.ent "^
"^-Qf^
is concerned, Spain is free to apply to and consult ^^^ ^
with the Export-Iraport Banic for credits for specific ^?v
projects on the same basis as any other country.
This letter acted to open the gates in United States relations
vri.th Spain; it was a clear repudiation of the poet \jar tactics that
had been employed, and it provided some indication of future American
plans for Spain,
Within a fevj months the Chase Bank and the National City Banlc
provided Spain xd-th a loan of thirty million dollars. The Congress,
spurred by the outbreak of the Korean VJar, voted to e:ctend credits
of sixty-t^ra and a half rrdllion dollars for Spanish aid under the
General Appropriations Act of 19^1.^ Later, much larger sums would
flow to Spain under Mutual Defense Assistance Acts, which provide the
pocketbook for NATO,
In the United Nations, on October 2? 19^0, seven Latin
American countries, plus the Philippines, subjd.ttcd a resolution
to revoke the 19ii-6 exclusion of Spain, This tir.io, the United States
actively supported the move in a "desire to return to normal practice
'aJ.S,, Department ox State Bulletir., .November 27, 19^0^ p^ 8^6,
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in exohansD.ng diplomatic representation. "3 By the fol2.G\d.nz llarch,
^tuUnited States Ambassador to Spain, Stanton Gid-ffiSj, would present
his credentials to General Franco in Madrdd,
With the restoration of full diploirjitic relations and economic
agreeTients between the United States and Spain a military arrangement
x^as sure to follow. The McClellan Resolution, vjhich passed the Senate
in April, 1951, called on the administration to make use of Spain's
militaiy potential.^ VJithin eight weeks the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Forrest Sherman, arrived in Madrid to open negotiations for
naval and air bases. The Western European nations, which had done
nothing toward incorporating Spain into NATO, were upset at this
unilateral move of the United States. Secretary Acheson, now apparently^
reconciled to the necessity of doing business with Frsmco made this
justification:
Mlitarj'' authorities are in general agreement
that Spain is of strategic importance to the general
defense of Western Europe ... . We have been tallcing
vath the British and French Governments for many
months about the possible role of Spain ,,, , VJe have
not been able to find a common position on this sub-
ject ... . However ... the United States has initiated
these exploratory conversations... . It has been and
is our firm intention to see to it that if Western
Europe is attacked it x-dll be defended - and not
liberated.
5
The Republican administration of General Eisenhower which entered
office in January 1953, seeraed to hold the same "finn intention" in
regard to the defense of Western Europe. Secretary of State Dulles
J>U,3,^ Dcpa:.'^:,.^:.^ c- Cj,,..,,::; 3a.ll3tin^ i)>ove.iiber 6 1930? po 75^;*
^•U.S., Congressional P-ocord, 82nd Cong., 1st sess.. Vol. 97,
pp. 2363, 329III
i^U.S., Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, p. 170.
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concluded, on September 26 1953^, the M?,drid Pact vrlth General Franco,
According to the Pact agreements , the United States was allowed to
build (at a cost of vuOO million) three airbases and one naval base
in Spain, The land under the bases, and all penaancnt buildings built
on the bases would belong to Spain. Each base would have a Spanish
officer comiaanding (with the help of an Aiacrican deputy commander)
and would fly only the Spanish flag. The security for the bases x^ould
be provided by Spanish anaed forces who would be given American equip-
ment for their task. The liianner in which the bases x/ould be utilized
in event of war is strictly dependent on the mutual agreement of both
nations,^ Obviously then, when the United States revised its policy
toward Franco, for better or worse, it vns forced to do so on Franco's
teiras. But xjhat of Franco? What had he to say after liis long period
in quarantine?
In a speech before the Cortes, Franco said of th<S United States,
Uow, there exist no conflicting interests between
our two nations. If, so far, our relations have erred
on the poor side and have progressed precariously, tliis
has been due to torpedoing by other countries .... If
it is true that the Araerican nation strives after ideals
of peace and justice, the Spanish people has follox^ed
that road without turning aside,
^
Francisco Franco had certainly not changed; he had never questioned
his right to rale Spain as had Roosevelt and many others, he had not
concerned himself with allo'iidng the fundamental liberties that Acheson
had been interested inj he had simply a\raited, and he had survived.
Now the United States would proiade I'lim, unilaterally, \rith all the
"^"J.S,, Department ci State, American Foreign Policy ^ 19i?0~1955
(Washin^Tton: US Government Printing Office, 195?);, pp» l696-l69*i •
/Spain, The Policy of Isolation^ pp, 50-5l«
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noui*ishmer/b he irdght require.
The United Nations howeverj, had been doing some soul-searching.
By the fall of 19^5, the General Assembly had reori-ented itself
towards a completely liberalised view on eligibility for membership.
Henceforth^ no applicant State would bo d=:nied on account of its
political rogine (pro^'idod it satisfied the noimal conditions recfuired
by the Charter). Henceforth, the UIJ ^rould not be a "private club"
but rather^ a truly representative oi^anization. Hencaforth, every
State would be presumed to be peace-loving until the contrary was
8
established.
On December ill 195*5, •.rith the endorsement of its friend and
ally, the United States, Franco Spain was accepted as a Meraber of
the United Nations,
°






Foreign policies r.re raost often dGtermined by tvo factors;
a) tho attitudes, opinions, and moral values of the statesmen x^ho
are responsible for the policy fonauiation, and,
b) the law of political expediencoa
In this brief rovioxi: of United States relations -^jith Spain
wo have seen an initial policy based largely upon the first factor
ultimately give \jay to a complete reversal brought about by the
second factor,
Franklin Roosevelt's policy_, stemming largely from his moral
conviction of the Franco regime (due to its having replaced by
force of arms, and ijith the help of totalitarian governments, i?hat
was considered to be a "damocratic" system)^ xias based on tvjo
assumptions. First, tliat because the priraary enemies of Eoosevelt's
time were fascist states, it would be of primary importance 'bo
"exterminate" all fascist political systems. Second, that the
latent communist threat x^rould not mature into a menace against
which the democracies x-?ould have to mobilize all available world
strength.
Because Roosevelt's second assuiaption was incorrect, every
action tal>:en to implement the first assumption during the post
war years would necessarily be counter-productive. That this
should have become obvious much earlier than it did is debatable.




in moving from a raorclly sound polic/ -that had been -wonderfully
(to then) succGssfiol to any now nnd uncertain policy based on
fear of the Russians and political expediency.
That is not to say that the American statesmen of the 19ii5
to 1955 period did not have alternatives in their implementation
of Roosevelt's policy. They certainly should have weighed each
move in the light of such questions as:
a) would the application of e^ctemal pressure for the purpose
of toppling a foreign regime constitute "internal intervention?"
b) would the Soviet Union be charmed into cooperation by
American compliance?
c) xTOUld a national people, faced with difficult times because
of foreign dislike of their regime, rise up and overthrox'j that regirae
- or would they rally to its support?
Had the Traman, Acheson adrainistration an3woI^2d these questions
differently they might have overcome their inertia at an earlier
date. It is argued that they faced many Earopean complications in
trying to choose a more realistic policy id.th regard to Spain, Yet,
•when the counter-productivity of the basic assumptions of their
policy finally became clear, even to them, they did not shrink from
telling the Western Eiropeans, straight out, that Earopean "compli-
cations" would not deter, or further delay, vital American policy.
That vital policy vjas, and is, of course, the policy of national
security, and herein lies a truth that must always be borne in the
minds of statesmen: All foreign policy must be a parb of national
security policy. In the conduct and control of foreign policy, any
independent policy that runs counter to ths nat:. j. security must
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